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MARSHES: NATURAL RESOURCES 
DAMAGES IN THE WAKE OF THE BP 
DEEPWATER HORIZON SPILL 
Itzchak E. Kornfeld* 
Abstract: This Article posits that in its role as the lead agency among the 
United States’ natural resources trustees, the National Oceanic & Atmos-
pheric Administration’s piecemeal assessment of natural resources dam-
ages, i.e., valuing one dead bird at a time or the death of just a tract of 
marsh, fails to consider the inherent worth or the value of the entire eco-
system. Valuing the destruction of the entire ecosystem as a result of the 
BP Deepwater Horizon well blowout is the best way to assess the damage 
in the Gulf Coast, particularly in south Louisiana. That crude oil spill re-
sulted in an estimated 53,000 barrels released per day, and a total volume 
of 4.9 million barrels that despoiled the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and 
the surrounding shorelines. As a consequence of the spill, thousands of 
birds, turtles, fish, and marshlands were left to die. 
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Introduction 
I don’t like to call it a disaster, because there has been no loss of human life. I 
am amazed at the publicity for the loss of a few birds.” 
—Fred L. Hartley, President of Union Oil Company, following  
the 1969 Santa Barbara Channel Oil Spill1 
 The BP Macondo well’s2 blowout, and the subsequent oil spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico,3 was one of the worst man-made environmental 
disasters that the United States has experienced to date. Beginning on 
April 20, 2010, and continuing for nearly ninety days thereafter, mil-
lions of barrels of oil gushed into the Gulf of Mexico,4 producing one 
of the most devastating eco-disasters since the Exxon Valdez’s ground-
ing in Prince William Sound, Alaska.5 In this Article, I focus upon the 
restoration of the Gulf Coast’s natural resources. This leads to the fol-
lowing question: how much is, for example, Louisiana’s state bird, the 
Brown pelican worth?6 What are people across the United States willing 
                                                                                                                      
1 1969 Oil Spill, U. Cal. Santa Barbara Dep’t of Geography, http://www.geog. 
ucsb.edu/~jeff/sb_69oilspill/69oilspill_articles2.html (last updated Dec. 2004) (quoting 
Fred L. Hartley) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 BP’s prospect, located within Mississippi Canyon Block 252 (MC 252), was called Ma-
condo and that is why I refer to it as the Macondo well. Art Berman, What Caused the Deep-
water Horizon Disaster?, TheOilDrum.com (May 21, 2010, 10:28 AM), http://www. 
theoildrum.com/node/6493. Concomitantly, the rig—the semi-submersible platform owned 
by Transocean from which the well was drilled—was named the Deepwater Horizon. See, 
e.g., David Hammer, 5 Key Human Errors, Colossal Mechanical Failure Led to Fatal Gulf Oil Rig 
Blowout, Times-Picayune, (Sept. 5, 2010, 3:08 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil- 
spill/index.ssf/2010/09/5_key_human_errors_colossal_me.html. 
3 See Berman, supra note 2. 
4 Alice-Azania Jarvis, BP Oil Spill: Disaster by Numbers, Independent (London), Sept. 14, 
2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/bp-oil-spill-disaster-by-numbers-2078396. 
html. 
5 See generally Riki Ott, Sound Truth and Corporate Myth$: The Legacy of the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (2005) (discussing the aftermath of the 1989 oil spill in Prince 
William Sound); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Exxon Valdez Re-Surfaces in the Gulf of Mexico and the 
Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 389 (2011) (dis-
cussing the Exxon Valdez oil spill). 
6 The Brown pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis) was first listed as an endangered species on 
June 2, 1970, and it was delisted on November 17, 2009. See Endangered Species Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removal of 
the Brown Pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis) from the Federal List of Endangered and 
Threatened Wildlife; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,443, 59,444 (Nov. 17, 2009) (codified at 
50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Species Profile for Brown pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis), U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=B02L (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011) (discussing the history of the Brown pelican’s listing and delisting). 
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to pay, in dollars and cents, for the survival of that bird species?7 $5.00? 
$100.00? $1,000.00? Or possibly $1,000,000.00? 
 When contemplating what that price ought to be, it is important to 
recall that until quite recently the Brown pelican was: 
Hounded by hunters and fishermen [for over a hundred 
years], driven to near-extinction by chemical pollution . . . 
[it], has survived a century of human abuse. . . . 
 The odd-looking seabird with a distinctive pouch beneath 
its foot-long bill was removed from the federal endangered 
species list only last November. Now its recovery could be un-
dermined by millions of gallons of oil polluting the Gulf since 
. . . [the] April 20 [Horizon] rig explosion.8 
Similarly, what price is the average American willing to pay for the ex-
tremely endangered Kemp’s ridley turtle?9 And how much for an acre 
of south Louisiana marsh? $2.00? $50.00? $10,000.00? More? Less? In-
deed, what is the value of the entire ecosystem?10 
 Finally, how much is the “national treasure” that is America’s Gulf 
Coast worth?11 What is the value of its natural resources, not only as an 
essential “economic engine for the entire United States,” but its waters, 
which “sustain a diverse and vibrant ecosystem?”12 Indeed, what is the 
Gulf’s “natural beauty” worth?13 What about its “historic” and cultural 
riches?14 
                                                                                                                      
7 See discussion infra Parts II–III (discussing natural resource damage valuation methods). 
8 John Flescher, Brown Pelican, Louisiana’s State Bird, Imperiled by Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 
Times-Picayune (May 19, 2010, 7:20 AM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index. 
ssf/2010/05/louisianas_state_bird_brown_pe.html. 
9 The Kemp’s ridley turtle was listed as an endangered species in 1970. See List of En-
dangered Foreign Fish and Wildlife, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,319, 18,322 (Dec. 2, 1970) (codified 
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 app. A). Kemp’s Ridley Turtle (Lepidochelys kempii), Nat’l Oceanic & At-
mospheric Admin., Fisheries Office of Protected Res., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/ 
species/turtles/kempsridley.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). (“[M]ale Kemp’s ridleys ap-
pear to occupy many different areas within the Gulf of Mexico. Some males migrate annu-
ally between feeding and breeding grounds, yet others may not migrate at all. . . . Kemp’s 
ridleys face threats on both nesting beaches and in the marine environment.”). 
10 See discussion infra Parts II–III. 
11 See Exec. Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313, 62,313 (Oct. 8, 2010) (“The Gulf 
Coast is a national treasure. Its natural resources are an important economic engine for 
the entire United States; its waters sustain a diverse and vibrant ecosystem; and the Gulf’s 
culture, natural beauty, and historic significance are unique.”). 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
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 The critical issue of the value of the Gulf’s natural resources will 
have to be confronted by the designated natural resources trustees.15 
Trustees include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, the lead agency, the Department of the Interior, and their co-
equal state partners.16 Indeed, the restoration of the Gulf Coast’s natu-
ral resources is one of the chief environmental tasks facing federal and 
state government agencies. Nevertheless, restoring the Gulf’s natural 
resources cannot be done in a vacuum.17 Clearly, any restoration plan 
must consider the environment.18 However, it must also include the 
people who live in the area and their history.19 Since south Louisiana 
took the brunt of the BP oil spill,20 this Article will focus on that geo-
graphic area. 
 Part I discusses the people of Louisiana and the culture that binds 
them to the marshes and the sea.21 Part II.A discusses examples of eco-
system services.22 Part II.B addresses the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and 
the fact that Congress is failing to develop a contemporary legal regime 
for this new type of ecological calamity.23 Part II.C explores the assess-
                                                                                                                      
15 Multiple sources of law designate natural resource trustees. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 
12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193, 194 (1988) (designating certain cabinet officers as the federal trus-
tees for natural resources damages); 15 C.F.R. § 990.11 (2011) (“The Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., provides for the designation of federal, state, and . . . 
local officials to act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources . . . .”); 40 
C.F.R. § 300.600 (2010) (“The President is required to designate in the NCP [CERCLA’s 
National Contingency Plan] those federal officials who are to act on behalf of the public as 
trustees for natural resources. Federal officials so designated will act pursuant to section 
107(f) of CERCLA, section 311(f)(5) of the CWA, and section 1006 of the OPA. . . . (1) 
Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary of Commerce shall act as trustee for natural resources 
managed or controlled by DOC [Department of Commerce] and for natural resources 
managed or controlled by other federal agencies and that are found in, under, or using 
waters navigable by deep draft vessels, tidally influenced waters, or waters of the contigu-
ous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the outer continental shelf.”) 
16 See Discharge of Oil From Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf of Mexico; In-
tent to Conduct Restoration Planning, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,800, 60,801 (Oct. 1, 2010); Deepwa-
ter Horizon/BP Oil Spill Response, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Off. Response & 
Restoration, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/dwh.php?entry_id=809 (last updated 
Oct. 28, 2010). 
17 See infra Part II (discussing possible valuation techniques and the effects of natural 
resource damage on an entire ecosystem). 
18 See infra Part II.C. 
19 See infra Part I. 
20 See, e.g., Anna Driver, On Louisiana Coast, Residents Bemoan a Lost Summer, Reuters, 
Aug. 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/27/us-oil-spill-louisiana-
idUSTRE67Q5F420100827 (explaining that Louisiana has experienced the most damage 
from the oil spill). 
21 See infra Part I. 
22 See infra Part II.A. 
23 See infra Part II.B. 
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ment of the value of natural resources and five methods of valuing nat-
ural resources, including: (1) Contingent Valuation Methodology; (2) 
Market Valuation Approach; (3) Restoration and Replacement Cost; 
(4) Use Value Methodology; and (5) Habitat Equivalency Analysis.24 
Part III deals with the natural resources trustees’ current methodology 
for valuing natural resources damages.25 Part IV analyzes the Natural 
Resource Damage Assessment Process (NRDA), the Deepwater Hori-
zon spill, and cost-benefit analysis.26 Finally, Part V discusses the failure 
of cost-benefit analysis and suggests that Congress’s reference to “natu-
ral resources” is to valuing the sum of those resources or the entire eco-
system collectively, not to valuing each resource individually.27 
I. Louisiana, Louisiana 
A. The People: Les Acadiens 
 Citizen participation is the hallmark of the NRDA process.28 More-
over, regulations promulgated under the Oil Pollution Act of 199029— 
one of the operative statutes under which the cleanup and restoration 
of south Louisiana has and will take place—also require that the respon-
sible parties (RPs), such as BP and Transocean in the Gulf disaster, be 
invited to participate in the NRDA activity.30 Due to the RPs’ expertise 
and agency capture,31 it is likely that commenting members of the pub-
lic who have been personally injured will be at a distinct technological 
and scientific disadvantage, relative to the relevant industry groups. 
                                                                                                                      
24 See infra Part II.C. 
25 See infra Part III. 
26 See infra Part IV. 
27 See infra Part V. 
28 See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 11.30(c)(1)(iii), 11.32(c) (2010) (stating that the costs of public 
participation can be assessed, and mandating public involvement in the NRDA process). 
29 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006); OPA Guidance 
About DARRP, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/ 
1_d.html (last updated July 19, 2010). 
30 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c)(1)–(2) (2011) (“Trustees must invite the responsible parties to 
participate in the natural resource damage assessment described in this part.”); see Dis-
charge of Oil From Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf of Mexico; Intent To Con-
duct Restoration Planning, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,800, 60,801 (Oct. 1, 2010) (identifying respon-
sible parties from the Gulf); Stephen Gidiere et al., The Coming Wave of Gulf Coast Oil Spill 
Litigation, 71 Ala. Law. 374, 376 (2010). 
31 See Detlof von Winterfeldt, Setting Standards for Offshore Oil Discharges: A Regulatory Deci-
sion Analysis, 30 Operations Res. 867, 868–69 (1982). See generally Protecting the Public Interest: 
Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the 
Courts, S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 50–51 (2010) (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold) 
(discussing agency capture). 
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 In order to fully understand how the injured and aggrieved public 
in south Louisiana will react to any remedy, one must understand these 
people’s present needs, past activities, and their sensibilities and atti-
tudes vis-à-vis the Gulf of Mexico’s environment.32 For those unfamiliar 
with the culture of the peoples of south Louisiana, it is critical to ap-
preciate fully that the spill’s destruction of the Gulf’s natural re-
sources,33 including the wildlife, will not begin to fade from memory 
for at least a few generations.34 Why? Because of the Cajuns’35 and the 
local native tribes’36 close relationship with the land and water of south 
Louisiana,37 where for some ten generations they have worked, lived, 
and gathered their families for outings and Fais do-dos—Cajun dance 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Barry Yeoman, Saving Louisiana: What Can We Do?, OnEarth ( Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.onearth.org/article/saving-louisiana-what-can-we-do. 
33 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) (2006) (defining natural resources as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, 
air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to . . . 
the United States (including the resources of the exclusive economic zone), any State or 
local government or Indian tribe, or any foreign government”); see Ray Mabus, America’s 
Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 1 
(2010) (discussing the impact of the oil spill on Gulf Coast residents), available at http:// 
www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/gulf-recovery-sep-2010.pdf. 
34 See, e.g., Mabus, supra note 33, at 39. Having lived and worked as a petroleum geolo-
gist in south Louisiana for over a decade, the author can personally attest to the impact 
that the Deepwater Horizon/BP Macondo spill has had, not only upon the natural re-
sources, but on the region’s people. 
35 Cajun is slang for les Cadiens or les Acadiens, who are a cultural or ethnic group that 
lives in south Louisiana and whose “capital” is Lafayette. See Jacques Henry, From Acadian to 
Cajun to Cadien: Ethnic Labelization and Construction of Identity, J. Am. Ethnic Hist., Summer 
1998, at 29, 29–47. They are the descendants of French Acadian refugees, who escaped per-
secution by English forces during the eighteenth century and traveled from Acadia, in the 
Canadian Maritime provinces, to south Louisiana. See Bruce J. Bourque, Ethnicity on the Mari-
time Peninsula, 1600–1759, 36 Ethnohistory 257, 260–63 (1989); Henry, supra, 29–47. These 
French-speaking refugees moved from life in the Acadian cities of Dalhousie, Shelbourne, 
Argyle, and as far west as Quebec, favoring a rural mode of life, fishing, and farming along 
the bayous. See Bourque, supra, 260–63; Henry, supra, 29–47. 
36 See Welcome to the United Houma Nation, United Houma Nation (Aug. 12, 2008), 
http://www.unitedhoumanation.org/node/3 (“The United Houma Nation (UHN) is a 
state recognized tribe of approximately 17,000 tribal citizens residing within a six-parish 
(county) service area encompassing 4,570 square miles. The six parishes, Terrebonne, 
Lafourche, Jefferson, St. Mary, St. Bernard and Plaquemines parishes are located along the 
southeastern coast of Louisiana. Within this area, distinct tribal communities are situated 
among the interwoven bayous and canals where Houmas traditionally earned a living. 
Although by land and road these communities are distant, they were historically very close 
by water. However, boat travel is no longer a viable option due to the effects of coastal ero-
sion, which has left these waterways either nonexistent or impassable and often treacher-
ous.”) 
37 See id. (describing the tribe’s relationship with the land and waters of Louisiana); see 
also Bourque, supra note 35, at 260–63; Henry, supra note 35, at 29–47. 
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parties.38 That is also why few in the southern reaches of the Bayou 
State can turn away from the hard and depressing facts of the spill, in-
cluding the horrific deaths of eleven of the oil platform’s workers who 
were taken away from this extremely close-knit community and the ex-
termination of the region’s fauna and flora.39 
 Indeed, as the millions of barrels of oil gushed from the wellbore, 
streamed into the Gulf, and made their way landward, they destroyed 
oyster beds, fisheries, and the livelihoods of fishermen, shrimpers, and 
crab processors.40 The oil additionally impacted ancillary businesses 
from Terrebonne Bay, in Louisiana’s LaFourche Parish, east to Bayou 
La Battre in Alabama’s Mobile County.41 A paradigm of the power of 
the Cajuns’ and native peoples’ intimate bond with south Louisiana’s 
resources is demonstrated by the following statement expressed by a 
participant at a Houma, Louisiana, post-spill town meeting: “We need 
to understand that the environment and our lifestyle and our commu-
nities and the businesses that flourish down here must work together.”42 
B. The Darker Side 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is also a glaring inconsis-
tency to this love affair with the Coast and its “resources”: a concomi-
tant love of, and reliance upon, the oil and gas industry.43 As was re-
cently pointed out by Professor Oliver Houck,44 
No state in the union has been more firmly wedded to the oil and gas 
industry than Louisiana. No more zealous preachers of the 
clean oil gospel can be found than the state’s politicians, who 
                                                                                                                      
38 A Glossary of Terms Used in New Orleans, ExperienceNewOrleans.com, http://www. 
experienceneworleans.com/glossary.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (defining fais do-do). 
39 See Jarvis, supra note 4 (describing death of platform workers and the extent of 
damage to the Gulf Coast’s land and environment); Yeoman, supra note 32 (discussing 
marine life’s importance to the Louisiana community). 
40 See Notice of Intent, Discharge of Oil from Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf 
of Mexico; Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,800, 60,801–02 (Oct. 
1, 2010); Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA), NOAA’s Oil Spill Response: 
Assessment and Restoration 1 (2010); NOAA, NOAA’s Oil Spill Response: Effects of 
Oil on Marine Mammals and Sea Turtles 1 (2010); NOAA, NOAA’s Oil Spill Re-
sponse: Fishing Industry in the Gulf of Mexico 1 (2010). 
41 See Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Nearshore Surface Oil Forecast 
Deepwater Horizion MC 252, at 1 (2010). 
42 See, e.g., Mabus, supra note 33, at i. 
43 See, e.g., Oliver Houck, Who Will Pay to Fix Louisiana?, Nation, July 12, 2010, at 11 
(describing Louisiana’s reliance on the oil and gas industry). 
44 Oliver A. Houck, Tulane U. L. Sch., http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlsfaculty/profiles. 
aspx?id=430 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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were elected by oil money (at the high end of industry cam-
paign funding) and have defended the industry from regula-
tion (including wetland protections), reduced its royalties 
with tax breaks and “royalty holidays” (thereby depriving the 
US Treasury of some $53 billion in revenues from existing off-
shore leases) . . . . 45 
 With this brief geographic and cultural sojourn now over, one of 
the main enterprises of this Article is to highlight the fact that the nec-
essary repair and restoration efforts in the Gulf will take decades.46 In-
deed, Americans cannot be allowed to forget this disaster, as they have 
countless others, including the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita.47 Lawyers, scientists, and lay people must keep this tragedy’s long-
term effects in the public’s eye, lest politicians are allowed to drop the 
ball on this issue in their haste to move on to what they deem to be 
more expedient political concerns.48 
                                                                                                                      
45 Houck, supra note 43, at 11 (emphasis added). 
46 See, e.g., id. (“It is bad, particularly for local communities, and the long term is any-
one’s guess. We still do not know the full Exxon Valdez story, and that was in a more con-
fined space, twenty-one years ago.”). See generally Ott, supra note 5 (discussing the legacy 
of the Exxon Valdez disaster). 
47 See, e.g., Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., New Orleans Five Years After the 
Storm: A New Disaster Amid Recovery 1, 5, 7 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
kaiserpolls/upload/8089.pdf (finding that seven out of ten of Orleans Parish residents feel 
the nation has forgotten the challenges they face). 
48 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 43, at 11 (describing political ties of government to in-
dustry and the need not to deny environmental damage). 
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II. Natural Resources Valuation 
A. Examples of Ecosystem Services49 
As the great Mississippi River Delta disappears, so do the ecosystems, econo-
mies and people that it holds. The Mississippi River is the solution. It has the 
water, sediment and energy to rebuild land, defend against hurricanes and 
again provide habitat, safety, livelihood, and prosperity. We must look to the 
natural functioning of the delta to guide us in restoration. 
—John Day, 200750 
 Ecosystems as a whole provide value beyond the individual natural 
resources that are their building blocks. Ecosystem functions or services 
are “‘the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems 
and the species that make them up sustain and fulfill human life.’ Eco-
systems provide a variety of services that individuals and communities 
use and rely on, not only for their quality of life but also for economic 
production.”51 Ecosystems encompass structural constituents like 
marsh flora, as well as dynamic procedures like nutrient cycling, water 
streams, and the life cycles of organisms like fish, oysters, and shrimp.52 
These structural constituents and dynamic procedures include “soil 
accumulation, habitat creation, reduced fetch, [and] obstructions to 
hurricane storm surges,” which engender ecological commodities such 
as oxygen, water, fauna, and services such as “hurricane and flood pro-
tection, water filtration, recreation, [and] aesthetic value.”53 
                                                                                                                     
 Ecological commodities are a broad category and include both ser-
vices and products obtained from ecosystems. They include: (1) purifi-
cation of the air and water; (2) mitigation of hurricanes and floods; (3) 
recreation; (4) generation and renewal of soil and soil fertility; (5) 
 
49 For excellent discussions of ecosystem services, see Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: 
What Are Ecosystem Services?, in Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural 
Ecosystems 1, 3–6 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). Seventeen ecosystem services were re-
cently identified and economically evaluated, with an estimated worldwide valuation of $33 
trillion per year, considerably in excess of total global gross national product of $18 trillion 
per year. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, Nature, 15 May 1997, at 253, 253. 
50 David Batker et al., Earth Econ., Gaining Ground: Wetlands, Hurricanes and 
the Economy: The Value of Restoring the Mississippi River Delta 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.eartheconomics.org/FileLibrary/file/Reports/Louisiana/Earth_Economics_Re- 
port_on_the_Mississippi_River_Delta_compressed.pdf. 
51 Id. at 22 (quoting Daily, supra note 49, at 3). 
52 See id. at 21. 
53 Id. 
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maintenance of biodiversity; (6) partial stabilization of climate; and (7) 
fishing, crabbing, and shrimping activities, among many others.54 
 Damages provisions in certain federal statutes have begun to take 
note of, and try to estimate, the value of lost natural resources and eco-
system services after disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon spill. 
B. Natural Resources Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) “addresses oil pollution and 
establishes liability for the discharge and substantial threat of a dis-
charge of oil to navigable U.S. waters and shorelines.”55 The statute 
aims, among other goals, to restore natural resources and lost services 
resulting from oil spills.56 OPA incorporates the natural resources dam-
ages provision of the Clean Water Act’s section 311, and the natural 
resources damages provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).57 
 Until recently, holding parties liable for damages to natural re-
sources was inconceivable. That changed with the prescient passage of 
natural resources provisions in section 311 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act—now commonly referred to as the Clean Water 
Act58—and in the subsequent enactment of CERCLA.59 Even following 
the passage of the latter two statutes, little effort was made to calculate 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 22 tbl.1, 34. 
55 OPA Guidance About DARRP, supra note 29. 
56 Id. 
57 See Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006)(explaining liability for and assess-
ment of natural resources damages under the Clean Water Act); Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
§ 1006, 33 U.S.C. § 2706 (2006) (explaining liability for and assessment of natural resources 
damages under OPA); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2006) (defining the scope of natural re-
source liability under CERCLA as “damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss result-
ing from such a [hazardous] release”); Kristina Alexander, Cong. Research Serv., 
R41396, The 2010 Oil Spill: Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under the Oil 
Pollution Act 4–5 (2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (providing for liability for natural 
resources damages, and stating that where natural resources damages are established pursu-
ant to CERCLA’s § 107(a)(4)(C), liability shall be to the United States, any State, or an In-
dian Tribe). 
58 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (“The costs of removal . . . shall include any costs or ex-
penses incurred . . . in the restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or 
destroyed as a result of a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance in violation of subsec-
tion (b) of this section.”). 
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607; Eric Hecox, Oil Spills, Clean Water Act § 311, and the Oil Pollution 
Act, Bureau of Land Mgmt., http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/pdf/Chapter8.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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the value of various natural resources, for example, fish, raptors, or 
drinking water.60 All that changed following the grounding of the Exx-
on Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska.61 In response to the Valdez 
spill, Congress passed the OPA, and in the process incorporated CER-
CLA’s natural resources damages provisions.62 
 However, a question remained regarding the appropriate method 
for calculating natural resources damages. The Department of Interior 
promulgated regulations pursuant to CERCLA that assessed natural 
resources damages as the lesser of either lost use value, calculated as 
market value, or replacement value.63 Those regulations were subse-
quently challenged, and the calculation of damages based only on 
market value was found to be in violation of CERCLA’s clear statutory 
command.64 
 Nonetheless, there remain a number of different ways to assess the 
value of natural resources.65 Five such valuation methodologies are de-
scribed below. 
C. Methods of Valuing Natural Resources66 
1. Contingent Valuation Methodology 
 Contingent Valuation Methodology (CVM) is an empirical tech-
nique in which a survey or questionnaire is developed and used to value 
a given natural resource and its ecological services.67 The survey or poll 
is used to sample a segment of the population.68 Its results are then em-
                                                                                                                      
60 See James Peck, Comment, Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigat-
ing Natural Resources Damages, 14 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 275, 277–78 (1999). 
61 See id. at 275, 277–78. 
62 33 U.S.C. § 2706; see Natural Resource Damages: A Primer, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http:// 
www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/nrd/primer.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
63 See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989). This opinion 
was handed down approximately four months following the Exxon Valdez. See id. 
64 See id. at 442. 
65 See Peck, supra note 60, at 277 (describing various methods of natural resources as-
sessment). 
66 A full discussion of valuation methodologies is beyond the scope of this Article. See 
generally Peck, supra note 60 (an excellent discussion of this topic); Kathryn Chelina Mac-
Donald, Comment, The Recovery of Restoration Costs: Analytical Synthesis of Common-Law Prop-
erty Damages, Restitution, and Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, 5 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 
255 (1991). 
67 See Peck, supra note 60, at 284 (citing William D. Schulze, Use of Direct Methods for 
Valuing Natural Resource Damages, in Valuing Natural Assets, The Economics of Natu-
ral Resource Damage Assessment 204, 207 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 
1993)). 
68 Id. 
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ployed to furnish the price that the members of that population are will-
ing to pay to sustain or reestablish that resource.69 Thus, CVM does not 
measure value directly.70 Rather, it is an experiential economic proce-
dure, which is employed to support a perceived measure of damages, 
based on the costs of restoration.71 CVM is also utilized in evaluating the 
soundness of calculating nonuse values.72 The validity of this technique 
as a measure of the value of a natural resource was upheld by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Ohio v. United States Department of the Inte-
rior.73 In Ohio, the Court recognized two broad standards for utilizing 
contingent valuation.74 They are: (1) restoration of the resource;75 and 
(2) payment of damages for “nonuse value.”76 Accordingly, damages 
must be assessed by measuring the “restoration costs” of a natural re-
source rather than by only measuring its “use values.”77 
                                                                                                                     
2. The Market Valuation Approach 
 The Market Valuation Approach (MVA) to natural resources valua-
tion “provides a relatively certain measure of resource value, as market 
value is reflected in the price for resources as traded in a definable mar-
ket.”78 However, “‘most government resources, particularly resources for 
which natural resource damages would be sought[,] may often have no 
market.’”79 Due to the limited number of definable markets for natural 
resources, market valuation has limited applicability. 
3. Restoration and Replacement Cost 
 The Restoration and Replacement Cost (RRC) approach directly 
measures the cost of restoring of a damaged natural resource and ad-
dresses the injury to a natural resource.80 “Restoration cost is the only 
valuation method that accounts for the uniqueness of each particular 
 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 284–85 (discussing criticisms of CVM). 
71 See id. 
72 See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 474–75 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
73 Id. at 478. 
74 See id. at 474–78. 
75 See id. at 478. 
76 See id. at 474–76. 
77 See id. at 474–78. 
78 Peck, supra note 60, at 282. 
79 Ohio v. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d at 463 (quoting the Department of Interior’s CER-
CLA 301 Project Team). 
80 Peck, supra note 60, at 283–84. 
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resource and the finite supply of natural resources . . . .”81 Indeed, the 
costs of restoration encompass the entire value of a given resource and 
are therefore an “intrinsic” measure of the extent of the damage to the 
resource.82 Nevertheless, restoration costs do “not directly measure the 
value of the damaged resource and can result in costs greatly exceeding the 
value of the damaged natural resources as measured by other meth-
ods.”83 
. U
etical example to illustrate this measure.85 Imag-
ine, t
 value to that on which the spoiled bird habitat 
Neve
ve values that are not fully 
and looking at 
a blue whale, a seal, or a seabird and their habitats. 
                                                                                                                     
4 se Value Methodology 
 Use Value Methodology (UVM) estimates the lost value of using a 
given resource after damage or destruction.84 In Ohio, the court posed 
the following hypoth
he court asked, 
a hazardous substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals and 
destroys a habitat for seabirds at a sealife reserve. The lost use 
value of the seals and seabird habitat would be measured by 
the market value of the fur seals’ pelts (which would be ap-
proximately $15 each) plus the selling price per acre of land 
comparable in
was located.86 
rtheless, the court held that, 
[w]hile it is not irrational to look to market price as one factor 
in determining the use value of a resource, it is unreasonable 
to view market price as the exclusive factor, or even the pre-
dominant one. From the bald eagle to the blue whale and 
snail darter, natural resources ha
captured by the market system.87 
Some of the non-market values include the enjoyment of sitting along 
the shoreline, in a boat in a marsh, or a boat in the Gulf, 
 
81 Id. at 283. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (emphasis added). 
84 Ohio v. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d at 438. 
85 See id. at 442. 
86 Id. (citation omitted). 
87 Id. at 462–63 (first emphasis added). 
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5. Habitat Equivalency Analysis 
 Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) is a methodology used to de-
termine compensation for resource injuries.88 “The principal concept 
underlying the method is that the public can be compensated for past 
losses of habitat resources through habitat replacement projects provid-
ing additional resources of the same type.”89 Trustees have previously 
used HEA for oil spills, including the 1997 Lake Barre, Louisiana pipe-
line spill.90 “Habitats involved in these analyses include seagrasses, coral 
reefs, tidal wetlands, salmon streams, and estuarine soft-bottom sedi-
ments.”91 “Man is inextricably linked to the ecosystem and can, there-
fore, be considered one of the benefactors of the services provided; 
however, human uses are not the focus of HEA.”92 
6. Difficulties in Calculating Natural Resources Damages 
 The take-away from the foregoing methodologies is that even the 
generous restoration cost method does not, and cannot, measure the 
exact value of the impaired resource.93 Moreover, restoration costs can 
result in costs which some have posited “greatly . . . exceed[] the value 
of the damaged natural resources as measured by other methods. It is 
generally accepted that a measure of damages that is disproportionate 
to value is contrary to the policy of promoting economic efficiency.”94 
Additionally, calculating restoration costs can raise a host of technical 
issues.95 For example, where does one set the baseline condition? What 
restoration techniques are suitable? What level of restoration will be 
deemed sufficient?96 Finally, there may be some situations where habi-
                                                                                                                      
88 La. Oil Spill Coordinators Office et al., Damage Assessment and Restora-
tion Plan: Texaco Pipeline Inc. Crude Oil Discharge 36 (1999) [hereinafter Damage 
Assessment Report], available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gc-rp/lakebarredarpfinal.pdf. 
89 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Habitat Equivalency Analysis: An Over-
view 1 (2006) [hereinafter Habitat Equivalency Analysis], available at http://www. 
darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/heaoverv.pdf. 
90 See Damage Assessment Report, supra note 88, at 5, 36 (“This Damage Assessment 
and Restoration Plan (DARP) has been prepared by state and federal natural resource 
Trustees to address the restoration of natural resources and resource services injured by 
the Texaco Pipeline Company Lake Barre oil spill on May 16, 1997 . . . .”). 
91 Habitat Equivalency Analysis, supra note 89, at 1. 
92 Restoration Economics: Habitat Equivalency Analysis, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Admin., http://www.csc.noaa.gov/coastal/economics/habitatequ.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
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tats have suffered so much damage that restoring “various ecosystem 
functions may not be possible.”97 
III. The Federal Natural Resources Trustees’ Current 
Methodology for Valuing Natural Resources Damages 
 In both CERCLA and OPA, Congress authorized the President to 
designate natural resources trustees (“Trustees”)98 to act on the pub-
lic’s behalf.99 In turn, the President designated the Secretary of the 
Department of Commerce to 
                                                                                                                     
act as trustee for natural resources managed or controlled by 
DOC [the Department of Commerce] and for natural re-
sources managed or controlled by other federal agencies and 
that are found in, under, or using waters navigable by deep 
draft vessels, tidally influenced waters, or waters of the con-
tiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the outer 
continental shelf.100 
The Secretary then delegated the trusteeship to the Department’s Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).101 
 “As the primary Federal natural resource trustee for coastal re-
sources, NOAA has responsibility for ensuring the restoration of coastal 
resources injured by releases of hazardous materials and of national 
 
97 Id. 
98 The President’s power to act derives from the public trust doctrine, pursuant to 
parens patriae power. See Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doc-
trines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 87, 
89 (1995). The public trust doctrine refers to the sovereign’s duty—whether federal or 
state—to maintain and preserve natural resources for the public’s benefit, and thus the 
doctrine specifies that natural resources belong to the public as a whole. See, e.g., Darren K. 
Cottriel, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an 
American Tradition?, 27 Pac. L.J. 1235, 1261 (1996). Alternatively, the term parens patriae 
signifies the government’s role as the guardian of its citizens’ natural resources, such as 
rivers, bayous, and wildlife. See Musiker, supra at 101–02. See generally Maine v. M/V Tamano, 
357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973) (injury caused to coastal waters and marine life by an oil 
spill can be the basis for damages in parens patriae suit). 
99 OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(2) (2006) (“The President shall designate the Federal of-
ficials who shall act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources . . . .”); CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) (2006) (“The President shall designate . . . the Federal 
officials who shall act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources . . . .”). 
100 40 C.F.R. § 300.600(b)(1) (2010). 
101 Trust Resources, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/pro- 
grams/nrd/trust_r.htm#doc (last updated Mar. 25, 2011) (“The DOC Secretary delegated 
Trustee responsibility to the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration.”). 
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marine sanctuary resources injured by physical impacts.”102 NOAA has 
rejected the use of CVM, preferring two other appraisal approaches: 
“resource-to-resource or service-to-service” and “valuation.”103 When 
employing the “resource-to-resource or service-to-service” methodol-
ogy, the Trustees establish the design of the restoration project in order 
to provide new services that are comparable to those that were de-
stroyed due to resource damage.104 Thus, the new resources or services 
simply replace those that were lost.105 Accordingly, assume the follow-
ing scenario: an oil spill damages five acres of wetlands. The restorative 
remedy will encompass the responsible party’s payment for, or in the 
alternative, the creation of, an equivalent five-acre wetland parcel. 
However, in order for this approach to be applicable, the new services 
must be “of the same type and quality” as the services that were lost.106 
 When replacement services are not analogous to lost services, 
Trustees are required to use a “valuation methodology” for scaling re-
storative plans.107 Here the Trustees have two choices: a “value-to-value” 
procedure, or a “value-to-cost” method.108 NOAA’s “preferred version 
of the valuation approach . . . [is the] ‘value-to-value,’ [because it] 
scales a project by adjusting the size of a restoration action to ensure 
that the present discounted value of project gains equals the present 
discounted value of the interim losses.”109 This methodology assesses 
the value of both ecological services lost and services supplied under 
the restoration plan when calculating total value.110 “Trustees achieve 
the correct scale when the value of services lost equals the value of new 
services provided under the restoration plan.”111 
 In the BP Horizon case, NOAA, the Department of Interior, and 
the State of Louisiana will therefore have to ask how much a Louisiana 
                                                                                                                      
102 See About Relevant Laws: NOAA’s Legal Authorities for Restoring Coastal Resources, Nat’l 
Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/about/laws.html (last up-
dated July 19, 2010). 
103 See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(2)–(3) (2011). 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Scaling Compensatory Restora-
tion Actions: Guidance Document for Natural Resource Damage Assessment Un-
der the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, at xii (1997) [hereinafter NOAA Guidance Docu-
ment], available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/scaling.pdf. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource 
Damages, 32 Envtl. L. 57, 67 (2002). 
111 See id. 
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Brown pelican is worth. Or, what is the value of an acre of wetlands? Or 
for that matter a turtle? However, these types of “value” assessments are 
wrong because they look at the “damage” in isolation from the ecosys-
tem.112 Indeed, when an ecosystem is damaged or destroyed as is the 
case in the Gulf Coast, especially in the south Louisiana portion of the 
Gulf, the entire system must be assessed.113 Otherwise, the piecemeal 
technique of valuing each natural resource is akin to a medical doctor 
discovering that a patient has cancer, and focusing on only on an initial 
tumor—that is, missing the forest for the trees. 
IV. The Natural Resource Damage Assessment Process 
 Under OPA’s Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) pro-
cess, the Trustees have the authority to identify potential restoration 
projects and solicit public comment on such projects before finalizing 
the restoration plan.114 The NRDA “is the process of quantifying mone-
tary damages for injuries to wildlife, habitat, and the services they pro-
vide, in the event of an oil spill or other pollution event.”115 Since the 
Valdez oil spill and OPA’s passage, NRDA has ripened into a distinct 
and well-developed field, with its own legal precedents, economic lit-
erature, and case histories.116 These are discussed below. 
 The trustees must follow specific mechanics to carry out their 
NRDA responsibilities. They must: (1) assess the damages to natural 
resources; (2) develop and implement a plan to restore, rehabilitate, or 
replace damaged natural resources; and (3) request the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States to commence civil or criminal litigation 
against the responsible parties.117 
 According to the Trustees, the full extent of potential injuries from 
the Gulf disaster is currently unknown, and may not be known for some 
                                                                                                                      
112 James L. Nicoll, The Irrationality of Economic Rationality in the Restoration of Natural Re-
sources, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 463, 470–71 (2000). 
113 See generally Steve Hampton & Matthew Zafonte, Calculating Compensatory Restoration 
in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Recent Experience in California (2002) (unpub-
lished manuscript prepared for the Proceedings of 2002 California World Oceans Conference, 
Santa Barbara, CA), available at nrm.dfg.ca.gov/FileHandler.ashx?DocumentID=22112. 
114 See, e.g., Gen. Electric Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 770–71 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). 
115 See Hampton & Zafonte, supra note 113, at 1. 
116 See generally Gen. Electric Co., 128 F.3d 767 (discussing the legal steps of the NRDA); 
Charles B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Restoration, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 
417 (1997) (detailing the legal process for creating the NRDA); Nicoll, supra note 112 
(arguing that restoration should not take into account economic values). 
117 40 C.F.R. § 300.615 (2010). 
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time.118 However, pursuant to the “Notice of Intent to Conduct Resto-
ration Planning,’’ as of August 19, 2010, the Trustees had documented 
oil on more than 950 miles of shoreline, including “salt marshes, sandy 
beaches, and mangroves.”119 Furthermore, as of June 29, 2010, the 
Trustees identified over 1900 live oiled birds and 400 live oiled sea tur-
tles.120 They had also collected more than 1850 visibly oiled dead birds, 
seventeen visibly oiled dead sea turtles, and five visibly oiled dead ma-
rine mammals.121 
 As could be expected, in the first few months following the spill, 
these numbers increased.122 Therefore, in contrast, on August 13, 2010, 
it was reported that there were 4768 dead animals, “4,080 of these were 
birds and 525 sea turtles.”123 Over 8332 species lived within the vicinity 
of the oil spill, including “the endangered Kemp’s Ridley turtle, as well 
as more than 1,200 fish, 200 birds, 1,400 molluscs, 1,500 crustaceans, 
and 29 marine mammals and three other sea turtle specimens.”124 Dis-
hearteningly, in October 2010, federal on-scene Coordinator Admiral 
Paul Zukunft observed: “We did have you know certainly a loss of wild-
life, but in comparison we had about 2300 dead oil birds and Exxon Val-
dez, that number was nearly 225,000.”125 These numbers represent only 
a portion of the wildlife that have been impacted by the spill, and the 
restoration planning process will further refine the total impact of this 
spill on the habitats and animals in the Gulf.126 
                                                                                                                      
118 Discharge of Oil From Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf of Mexico; Intent 
To Conduct Restoration Planning, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,800, 60,801–02 (Oct. 1, 2010). 
119 Id. at 60,802. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Paul Rioux, Oil Spill Plugged, but More Oiled Birds than Ever are Being Found, Times-
Picayune (Aug. 8, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/ 
2010/08/oil_spill_plugged_but_more_oil.html. 
123 Jarvis, supra note 4. 
124 Id. 
125 Melanie Driscoll, How Many Birds Died in the BP Oil Spill?, Audubon Mag. Blog 
(Oct. 28, 2010), http://magblog.audubon.org/how-many-birds-died-bp-oil-spill. 
126 See Discharge of Oil From Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf of Mexico; In-
tent To Conduct Restoration Planning, 75 Fed. Reg. at 60,802. (“The full nature and ex-
tent of injuries will be determined during the injury assessment phase of restoration plan-
ning.”). 
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A. Wrong Again! The Downside of the Natural Resources Restoration Process 
Initially, environmentalism was built on a simple but radical principle: let 
nature be. The hope was that science could point the way to measures that 
would let nature co-exist with human exploitation.127 
 The process that the national Trustees currently employ to assess 
natural resources damages barks up the wrong tree. What is more, the 
system is beset with biological faults. First and foremost, it simply ig-
nores the reality of ecosystems as “dynamic, interacting complexes of 
living organisms and their nonliving environment within a defined ar-
ea.”128 Rather its focus is on individual natural resources like fish, air, 
and water.129 This is particularly true of the UVM, RRC, and MVA 
methodologies.130 
 Similarly, the resource-to-resource methodology strikes one as a 
puerile and impractical way to measure the value of a natural resource. 
For example, in the restoration following a 1997 pipeline spill in Lake 
Barre, also in south Louisiana, where marsh grasses were destroyed, the 
Trustees’ remedy was to plant marsh grass on East Timbalier Island 
some fifteen miles to the southeast.131 Lake Barre is located in Terre-
bonne Parish, while East Timbalier Island is located in LaFourche Par-
ish. “Several [local] commenters objected to the project based on its 
location in Lafourche Parish. They wanted a project to be done in Ter-
rebonne Parish. . . . [and] more local participation in the process, and 
suggested that the Trustees should have specifically requested restora-
tion ideas from the parish.”132 However, this option was rejected as un-
workable.133 
                                                                                                                      
127 Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Re-
source Regulation, 26 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 1, 1 (2005). 
128 The H. John Heinz III Ctr. for Sci., Econ. and the Env’t, The State of the 
Nation’s Ecosystems 2008: Measuring the Lands, Waters, and Living Resources of 
the United States 3 fig.2 (2008), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/ecosystems/ 
2008report/pdf_files/Highlights_Final_low_res.pdf. 
129 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) (2006). 
130 See supra Part II.C. 
131 Damage Assessment Report, supra note 88, at 5, 52 (“Based on the ranking, the 
Trustees determined that marsh enhancement (planting) on East Timbalier Island was the 
preferred marsh restoration alternative to compensate for injuries from the Lake Barre 
incident . . . .”). 
132 Id. at 14 (“T]he Trustees considered the proximity of restoration alternatives to the 
location of the spill. The preferred project was considered to be within a reasonable dis-
tance (< 18 miles) from the site of the spill, and was located within the same watershed.”). 
133 See id. 
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 What benefits accrue to the local ecology and the people who use 
that ecosystem by planting marsh grass some fifteen miles away, in an-
other county? Is this type of remedy a common sense one as a substitute 
for the marsh grass destroyed? Why would the Trustees not make every 
effort to include “local participation in the effort”?134 Additionally, the 
Trustees did not, and in fact could not, argue that the Lake Barre res-
toration project could not have restored an area adjacent to the de-
spoiled marsh grass because it could not be brought back to life for a 
decade. Why? Because, in their Restoration Plan, they in fact assert that 
the marsh grass in the spill area was growing back naturally.135 
B. Valuation and Scaling: When You Want to Reject Everything Else,  
Fall Back on Economics 
 A similar argument can be made against the valuation approach. 
The choice of a restoration project employs an economic formula 
called cost-benefit analysis (CBA).136 While the definition of the term 
“cost-benefit analysis” varies,137 Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[a]n 
analytical technique that weighs the costs of a proposed decision, hold-
ing, or project against the expected advantages, economic or other-
wise.”138 A cost-benefit analysis requires one to assign a monetary value 
to the benefits and costs being weighed.139 Often, “future costs and 
benefits are discounted, or treated as equivalent to smaller amounts of 
money in today’s dollars.”140 
 The history and current use of CBA in environmental decision-
making, including “whether regulators should use cost-benefit analysis 
                                                                                                                      
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 6 (“Approximately 4,327 acres of marsh were exposed to oil resulting from 
the incident. Most of the exposed marsh was determined to be fully functioning or recov-
ering to full functioning within four months after the release. Marsh function in approxi-
mately 162 acres was affected for a longer period but was expected to be fully recovered 
two years following the incident, except for a total of 0.28 acres that lost virtually all above-
ground biomass.”). 
136 Nicoll, supra note 112, at 479. 
137 Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Con-
ference Papers, in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Per-
spectives 317, 317 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). 
138 Black’s Law Dictionary 399 (9th ed. 2009). 
139 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1557–58 (2002). 
140 Id. at 1559. 
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in evaluating their decisions” has been quite “contentious.”141 This is 
because CBA 
requires that the costs and benefits of a proposed course of 
action (including benefits such as saving human lives and pro-
tecting human health) be quantified and then translated into 
dollar terms. Cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations is 
said to be necessary in order to avoid adopting inefficient 
rules that would impose ruinous economic costs.142 
 The basis for the use of economic techniques such as CBA, and the 
field of law and economics generally, is rooted in the University of Chi-
cago Law School of the 1960s.143 It began with Ronald Coase144 who 
was followed by others at Chicago, including now Judge Richard Pos-
ner145 and Cass Sunstein.146 Each in his own way pushed CBA into both 
the legal and public marketplace of ideas. However, the crossover from 
academic theory to use in government made its way into the regulatory 
framework only after President Ronald Reagan’s director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), David Stockman,147 pushed CBA 
as part of President Reagan’s regulatory revolution.148 
 Soon after entering office in 1981, President Reagan issued Execu-
tive Order 12,291, which set in motion the cost-benefit analysis of envi-
ronmental regulations.149 For example, section 2 of the order provides: 
[] Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the po-
tential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the po-
tential costs to society; [] Regulatory objectives shall be cho-
                                                                                                                      
141 See Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was Environmental 
Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 155, 155 (2005). 
142 Id. 
143 The John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, U. Chi. L. Sch., http://www.law. 
uchicago.edu/Lawecon (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
144 Ronald H. Coase, U. Chi. L. Sch., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/coase (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2011); see, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
145 Richard A. Posner, U. Chi. L. Sch., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011); see, e.g., Posner, supra note 137, at 317. 
146 Cass R. Sunstein, U. Chi. L. Sch., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/sunstein/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011); see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation 
of Powers, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1267 (1981). 
147Former Directors of OMB and BOB, Off. Mgmt. & Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/organization_former_directors/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
148 See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489, 1505–06 (2002). 
149 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 app. at 431 (1982). 
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sen to maximize the net benefits to society; [and] Among al-
ternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the al-
ternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen.150 
 These vacuous standards—after all, what standard should one use 
to decide “the alternative involving the least net cost to society” —were then 
imposed as part of President Reagan’s attempt to dismantle the envi-
ronmental regulatory scheme that Congress had labored to establish 
for the previous eleven years.151 As Rena Steinzor has observed, cost-
benefit analysis has failed.152 
V. Cost-Benefit Analysis Has Failed 
 Cost-benefit analysis has been the primary means of “assess[ing] 
the costs and benefits of regulation” for the past twenty years.153 
But its use has come under sharp criticism from those who 
point out that it has been used as a tool to stymie health, safe-
ty and environmental regulation. That was never truer than 
during the [George W.] Bush years, but in fact cost-benefit 
was a significant barrier to progress even during the more 
regulation-friendly Clinton Administration. 
 The idea of quantifying costs and benefits, and then weigh-
ing them against each other sounds logical in theory, but it 
works terribly in the realm of regulating health and environ-
mental protections.154 
Indeed, a recent study found that the use of CBA would have resulted 
in the wrong outcome in three environmental regulatory decisions: 
“the removal of lead from gasoline in the 1970s and 1980s, the decision 
not to dam the Grand Canyon for hydroelectric power in the 1960s, and 
the strict regulation of workplace exposure to vinyl chloride in 1974.”155 
Thus, from an environmental policy-making perspective, the purpose 
of an agency’s data gathering and application of the scientific method 
is to “support regulatory and management decisions . . . [which] must 
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be insulated to the extent feasible against the vagaries of the political 
world.”156 The CBA process—rooted in economics—is a political tool, 
not a scientific one.157 
 CBA is a methodology that looks solely at costs and benefits.158 But 
for whose cost and for whose benefit? Will it be used for the benefit of 
the wildlife that will need to remake its home in south Louisiana? Will 
it be for the destroyed marshes or for the Cajun and native tribes of 
south Louisiana? Alternatively, will the benefit be for that nebulous 
mass referred to by politicians as the “American People”? 
 If the cost has to be borne by the people of Portland, Oregon or 
Portland, Maine, will they be willing to pick up the costs for the benefit 
of people who live thousands of miles away from them? Will they be 
ready to pony up the funds necessary to restore one of the great treas-
ures of the lower forty-eight? And what if they are not? Will the federal 
government still be willing to step up and do what is right for south 
Louisiana, despite the political ramifications? Remember to keep your 
eye on that enterprise, as the future rolls around. What is more, if these 
are the questions that are still being asked, America has made little 
progress since the last large-scale well blowout in the lower forty-eight 
occurred: the 1969 Union Oil Santa Barbara Channel spill, which, in 
part, heralded the beginning of the environmental age.159 
A. Habitat Equivalency Analysis: Ecological Isolationism 
 No less flawed is the HEA technique, whereby the Trustees seek to 
resuscitate habitats—defined as “the specific areas within the geo-
graphical area occupied by the species . . . on which are found those 
physical or biological features . . . essential to the conservation of the 
species.”160 In HEA, the Trustees analyze habitats in isolation from the 
entire ecological framework.161 Moreover, one perspective of the NRDA 
process is via the “services provided” to people and not to the species, 
ecology, or the environment.162 In other words, the process is anthro-
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pomorphic.163 The HEA procedure therefore veers away from the 
ethos that the natural resources are valuable or even “holy” in and of 
themselves.164 
                                                                                                                     
 This assessment or perception by the Trustees wholly ignores the 
value of species that the drafters of the Endangered Species Act under-
stood at the time of its passage in 1973.165 Thus, HEA not only ignores 
the realities of ecosystems, but it looks backwards to an archaic age 
where nature and “natural resources” existed solely to serve man. This 
outdated view is obvious from the first definition of “natural resources” 
in Black’s Law Dictionary: “Any material in its native state which when 
extracted has economic value . . . .”166 
B. Congressional Intent: “Natural Resources” Indicative of the Whole Ecosystem 
 Finally, using a statutory interpretation analysis, the methodologies 
employed by the Trustees appear to be ultra vires, because CERCLA’s 
legislative history refers solely to “natural resources,” referring to the eco-
system as a whole, not “natural resource,” referring to each individual 
component of the ecosystem.167 For example, in the House of Repre-
sentatives, Representative Jones asserted the following in unequivocal 
terms: “[t]he purpose of the regime, rather, is to make whole the natu-
ral resources that suffer injury from releases of hazardous substances.”168 
 Similarly, on the Senate side, Senator Mitchell, who shepherded the 
natural resources section of CERCLA through the Senate, emphasized 
that “we do not want damage to natural resources to await the workings of 
that [common-law tort litigation] process.”169 Likewise, Senator Williams 
declared “[t]he legislation will provide for the restoration of natural re-
sources which have been damaged.”170 and Senator Chaffee said “[t]he 
provision . . . for restoration of damaged natural resources remains in the 
legislation we are considering today.”171 Thus, I posit that the reference 
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to “natural resources” is to the sum of those resources or the entire ecosystem. 
Otherwise, why would these legislators have referred to natural resource 
in the plural? Had they meant to refer to individual resources, I believe 
that they would have indicated “each natural resource.” 
Conclusion 
Agencies may be subject to focused political pressures that drive their 
preferences in directions that reflect special interests rather than the 
public interest. Even if agency personnel are firmly dedicated to pursu-
ing the public interest, intense and focused political pressures may 
cause them to misinterpret that interest. The result is a high potential 
that regulatory decisions will reflect the goals and political sensitivities 
of bureaucrats and legislators rather than those of the electorate.172 
 The BP Horizon oil spill is just the latest environmental and eco-
logical assault visited upon south Louisiana that resulted from Amer-
ica’s insatiable thirst for oil. Of course, the adherents of cost-benefit 
analysis may argue that the benefits of drilling for oil at “home” far 
outweigh the benefits that some coastline, marshes, and a few thousand 
birds, mammals, turtles, and other fauna may offer to the people and 
tourists of south Louisiana.173 They may also argue, according to their 
own version of prophecy, that in the long run, things will get back to 
normal. Nevertheless, as experiences from other locales like Prince Wil-
liam Sound in Alaska demonstrate, it takes nature a long, long time to 
heal itself.174 
 One example of this train of thought was pronounced by Repre-
sentative Don Young of Alaska, who is currently the senior Republican 
on the House Natural Resources Committee.175 When referring to the 
BP Deepwater Horizon spill in early June 2010, Congressman Young 
asserted: 
This is not an environmental disaster, and I will say that again 
and again because it is a natural phenomena [sic]. Oil has 
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seeped into this ocean for centuries, will continue to do it. 
During World War II there was over 10 million barrels of oil 
spilt [sic] from ships, and no natural catastrophe. . . . We will 
lose some birds, we will lose some fixed sealife, but overall it 
will recover.176 
Mr. Young was assailed for these views.177 But why should he care? He 
won his seat for a twentieth term in the November 2010 midterm elec-
tion.178 Moreover, “[i]n the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when Sen. 
John McCain proposed that Young redirect his prized pork money to 
help rebuild New Orleans, Young accused his detractors of ‘ignorance 
and stupidity.’”179 He said the victims of Katrina “can kiss my ear!”180 
 The long and arduous task, then, is for each of us to pick a small 
part in reviving the south Louisiana coast and other areas despoiled by 
humankind. Changing the minds of the “Don Youngs” in the country, 
or working to have others elected in their place, is one manageable 
part of this task. If we all work together, we will be able to conquer the 
greatest of apathies and ignorance. We can return the beauty of south 
Louisiana that our generation and previous generations have toiled to 
destroy, while allowing the people of the region to fashion a natural 
resources remedy that will be a hallmark of things to come. And, 
whether we believe in God or not, we can—each of us—declare at the 
end of the day that we worked to fulfill the Jewish concept of tikkun 
olam: “repair [of] the earth.”181 
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